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This paper discusses finance problems of small firms. Since small firms and banks
belong to different economic worlds, as a result of which information assymetries
emerge, credit rationing leads to sub-optimal financing arrangements. The paper
analyses institutional solutions to these information assymetries between banks and
small firms and argues that, as a result of the political-economic development of
France since the Second World War, production networks around large firms have
become the institutional solution for the finance problems of small firms. These
intricate links allow for multi-layered information, which can be meaningfully
understood by both, to flow smoothly between large and small firms. The paper
concludes by raising the relevance of this particular solution for similar problems in
other countries.
Zusammenfassung
In dem Papier steht das Finanzierungsproblem kleiner Unternehmen im Mittelpunkt.
Angesichts der Tatsache, daß Kleinunternehmen und Banken unterschiedlichen
ökonomischen „Welten“ angehören und es deshalb zu asymmetrischen
Informationsniveaus kommt, folgen aus der Beschränkung von Krediten suboptimale
Finanzierungsarrangements. Deshalb werden in dem Papier institutionelle Lösungen
für diese Informationsasymmetrien zwischen den Banken und den kleinen
Unternehmen analysiert. Bezogen auf Frankreich zeigt sich als Resultat der politisch-
ökonomischen Entwicklung nach dem 2. Weltkrieg, daß Produktionsnetzwerke rund
um Großunternehmen zu einer institutionellen Lösung der Finanzierungsprobleme
der Kleinunternehmen geworden sind, da dadurch die bestehenden
Informationsasymmetrien vermindert werden. Das Papier schließt mit der
Überlegung, welche Bedeutung diese spezifische Lösung für ähnliche Probleme in
anderen Ländern hat.Table of Contents
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Since the early 1980s, scientific observers, business analysts, consultants and
policy practitioners have drawn attention to the re-emergence of small firms as
important economic actors. A vigorous debate, involving researchers in very
different disciplines —economics, comparative political economy, industrial
sociology, political science and policy sciences— ensued on the role of SMEs
in economic development (Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Piore and Sabel, 1984;
Loveman and Sengenberger, 1991; Harrison, 1994; Benko and Lipietz, 1992).
Surprisingly enough, up until very recently, this literature has given little
attention to a fundamental (and logically prior) question —how SMEs obtained
the finance necessary for their activities. Despite the obvious differences
between large and small firms, it appeared as if, in economic theory in
particular, they were treated as “small” versions of the large manufacturing
firm, without further attention to whatever industrial specificities they may have.
However, finance in general and credit in particular is especially critical for
SMEs, since they are too small to finance themselves through retained
earnings and too unpredictable for equity financing, yet belong to a
fundamentally different world from the banks —the volatility and instability of
the entrepreneur versus the risk aversion and conservatism of the financial
world— which makes access to credit difficult.
In recent years, the problem has received more systematic attention. Deeg
(Deeg, 1992) and Vitols (Vitols, 1995) discuss the financing of SMEs in
Germany, and go into detail about the institutional solutions provided by the
German political economy: locally managed boards of local savings banks
evaluate credit requests. In a related way, (Dei Ottati, 1994) discusses the
intricate financing and production structures in (for his purposes idealtypical,
but in reality Italian) industrial districts: through a mechanism of generalised
exchange —interlinking credit is the technical term— small and large firms in
an industrial district can use each others resources for investment.
This paper is a contribution to that debate. It argues that a specific institutional
solution exists for the finance gap between SMEs and banks in France: the
integration of the SMEs, as suppliers to large firms, into networks of
administrative, industrial and financial elites.
Since the finance gap has its roots, in our view, in information assymetries,
this information gap needs to be bridged in order to resolve the liquidity2
problems. The institutional solution provided in France builds on the central
role of the large firm in the French industrial landscape. The large
manufacturing firm acts as a go-between in the relationship between banks
and SMEs. Because of its position vis-à-vis the small firm, it has a vast amount
of operational inside knowledge, which, through the cohesive elite networks at
the top of the French economy, is transferred to the banks —either as hard
evaluations, or as signals about the estimated condition of the SME. This
information then becomes part of the evaluation package that the bank uses in
its assessment of the SME’s financing question. In exchange for the “extra”
information, obtained directly or indirectly through the LMF, the bank grants
credit. If the bank remains uncertain about the financial risk associated with
the SME, the large firm can, relying on the information it has at its disposal,
become the prime financier for the small firm.
A few important limitations of the analysis in this paper should be addressed.
First of all, it only deals with suppliers to large firms, not with other SMEs.
Large firm intermediation in the relationship between the SME and the
financial sphere is, as far as we can tell, specific to the supplier-buyer
relationship.
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 Suppliers therefore are very different from other small firms: it is
precisely the relative lack of support from larger firms that they can associate
themselves with, which makes other types of firms especially vulnerable to the
vicious cycle of underfinancing as a result of the finance gap. The machine
tool sector and the textile industry are the prime examples of sectors
consisting of many SMEs who produce directly for the market without being
integrated into larger networks. Both went through severe crises in the 1980s,
and succumbed to international competition or relocated in low-wage countries
(Ziegler, 1994; Levy, 1994). Secondly, we also exclude groupings of SMEs
who, by virtue of their combined size, have access to finance the way large
firms do. Third and last, because of the institutional focus of the paper, it
should be clear that what we say is only meant to apply to suppliers in France.
It is only in France that the finance gap is bridged through the large firms,
which belong to both the SME and the financial world. This being said, it
should be clear that certain elements that we describe may be important in
other countries as well, and we certainly hope that other researchers will be
stimulated by our analysis to pursue similar ideas.
The paper consists of four parts. The first explores the theoretical relevance of
studying small firm finance, and embeds the argument of the paper in the
broader institutional literature. The second discusses the signalling effects in
the  relationship between the large firm, the small firm and the bank. The third
discusses the delegation of finance to the large firm, and the final section
concludes by recapitulating the main points of the paper.3
2. Worlds of production and financing conventions
Small and medium-sized firms (SMEs below) do not belong to the same “world
of production” as the large firms (Salais and Storper, 1993; Storper and Salais,
1992). The existence of SMEs is a result of their flexibility, i.e. their capacity of
responding to non-anticipated fluctuations in demand, and of their
specialisation in dedicated markets (Penrose, 1963; Berger and Piore, 1980).
SMEs therefore are, in Salais and Storper’s terms (Salais and Storper, 1992),
primarily located in the “Marshallian” world of production, where quality and
versatility are the prime determinants of success, instead of the “industrial
world” of standardised mass production, the vestige of the large firm.
2.1. The finance gap as information gap
Financing, however, is organised around the problématique of large, mass-
producing firms. Banks use existing capital as collateral to loans —of which
large firms, by definition, have more— evaluate investment projects in terms of
the stability and certainty of their return —a direct function of the economies of
scale associated with large firm strategies (see, for the continuing salience of
economies of scale, Piore, 1993)— and are generally averse to the type of
flexibility associated with economies of scope.
SMEs and banks thus belong to fundamentally different worlds: banks to the
world of stability and risk aversion; small firms to that of volatility and
entrepreneurship. And since they belong to different worlds, the usual (or
better: “normal”) flow of information which structures financing conventions, is
hard to sustain. The information from one world is almost “incommensurable”
(borrowing the late Thomas Kuhn’s notion on competing scientific paradigms)
with the evaluation criteria used in the other. The bank has no instruments to
evaluate SMEs: the net value of firms is too low, and the industrial project too
ephemeral and specialised for banks to understand. Because of this
fundamental incommensurability, small firms are, in principle, caught in a
vicious cycle of underfinancing and technological backwardness: unable to
obtain credit, and too small and volatile for public offerings, SMEs almost
naturally end up as traditional producers. The information assymetries results
in a finance gap (Binks, et al., 1992).
This universal problem of monitoring small and medium-sized firms takes on a
particular salience in France where Malthusianism remains the dominant SME
ideology, even in the late 20th century. Since SMEs are very frequently still
family enterprises, owners prefer to keep all information on the operation of
their firm from outsiders. The necessary information to assess the economic
health of the firm is often kept even from the work force, despite legal4
provisions for the dissemination of information to works councils.
ii
 The practical
alternative to bank financing is the stock market. For three reasons, however,
French SMEs appear to be very unfavorable candidates for that. The first
problem is the Malthusian nature of the small firms. One could, in the limit,
envision the pater familias/company owner discussing the future of the
company with a banker, even though the fear of the omniscient French state
checking the books as well (through the ownership of banks) will certainly
create some hurdles to the depth of trust in this relationship. But it is almost
impossible to imagine a French family-owned SME to "go public,“ issue shares
and be subject to relatively strict accounting and publication rules. French
banks, moreover, are notoriously centralised and incapable of addressing their
clients on their own terms, thus enlarging the finance gap (Quack and
Hildebrandt, 1995). Second, as elsewhere, SMEs are usually simply too small
and unstable to be able to issue stock credibly.
iii
 If banks are unable to assess
risks, how would others be able to do so? Finally, the stock market has up until
very recently basically been entirely marginal in financing French companies
—true for the large firms, but even more so for the small firms.
iv
The usual bank response to this situation is credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). Since every banker is supposed to be able to attribute a subjective
default value to every request for funds, there is  a threshold, below which
credit becomes inaccessible for a firm. SME markets are more unstable than
others; a condition which will translate into a relatively lower credit threshold —
and therefore higher credit rationing (Cieply 1995b). In short: the information
assymetries lead to a sub-optimal financing situation.
This market failure problem can be resolved through experts (Knight, 1921;
Rivaud-Danset, 1995). In order to evaluate the credit requests, the bank could
appeal to an outside expert, who understands the markets of SMEs sufficiently
to be able to asses the investment project of the SME. These experts are the
only ones capable of objectifying the SME’s (subjective) default probability. As
a result, some SMEs, to whom credit was denied under the first response of
the banks, will be able to obtain credit, while some projects which fell below
the subjective threshold, but on false premises, will not be granted credit. The
use of experts thus increases the allocative efficiency of the credit system.
In what follows, we will demonstrate that the French situation is analytically
comparable to the expert solution described above. We make one central
assumption, i.e. that the bank has limited in-house expert capacities, since these
are concentrated in a limited number of departments (study and research
department, for example) inside the bank; this forces them to look for outside
experts. Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity we assume that one expert
inside the bank follows one sector. Given the relatively high transaction costs
associated with the evaluation of credit requests, this implies that small sum
projects are excluded from this evaluation (see Psillaki and Mondello, 1995 for5
an elaboration of this argument), which de facto excludes most SME requests
for finance.
2.2. Institutional solutions to market failure: the role of large firms
The stalemate that ensues as a result of the informational assymetries in the
relationship between SMEs and banks cannot be resolved without recourse to
other, largely non-economic resources. Since the distribution of those extra-
economic resources —political and social institutions— is a result of history
and therefore different for different institutional frameworks, solutions to the
market failure problems identified above will tend to differ geographically (see
Granovetter, 1985 for this argument in its most general way, and Deeg, 1992
and Vitols, 1995, and Dei Ottati, 1994, on the specifics for SME financing in
Germany and Italy, respectively).
The main institution in the French context which provides the resources for the
solution of these problems, is the large manufacturing firm (LMF henceforth).
LMF —grands groupes, as they are called in France—  play(ed) a central role
in the country’s postwar economic development. In 1988, roughly half of the
industrial production in France took place in the 25 largest concerns and firms;
the 30 largest firms accounted for over 50% of exports (Holcblat and Husson,
1990). Beside being the most important industrial agents in terms of
contribution to GNP since the Second World War, they also indirectly control
the fate of many suppliers, through supplier networks, sub-contracting
arrangements and the purchase of machine tools.
As in many other countries, French large firms too have reorganised their
activities fundamentally in the 1980s. Once typical vertically integrated large
corporations, French LMF started to outsource  many of their activities and
restructured their ties with their suppliers. In response to increased competition
and market volatility, large firms reorganised their operations and reduced their
activities to what they considered their “strategic core.” Many of the sub-
contracting activities which used to be a “logical” part of the firm, were
gradually transferred to outside suppliers, with whom the companies had
simultaneously much closer and looser ties. Closer because the large firms
involved the suppliers in strategic areas such as product development and
technology acquisition; looser because whatever preferential relationship
existed with some suppliers disappeared.
Gradually, as this process unfolded, the firms began to experiment with new
arrangements. Instead of relying on a relatively large number of suppliers to
deliver a multitude of small parts which are then assembled on the LF’s
premises, large firms sub-contracted these subassemblies and demanded from6
their suppliers that they become systems suppliers, responsible for product
development, delivery and quality (Sabel, 1993). As a result of this reor-
ganisation of industrial activities, LMF and SMEs thus find themselves in a
much tighter relationship than before; one in which the SME has virtually
become a part of the large firm.
Yet characterising the relationship between the LMF and the SME as one of
roughly equal partners in an industrial project, would not do justice to the finer
details of the situation in France. Most fundamentally, the relation —in France
as elsewhere (Harrison, 1994)— is fundamentally assymetric: in France, the
large firm controls the small firm without fear of reversal of the roles. SMEs
hold no particular knowledge beyond the LMF’s grasp, and even though the
relationship may appear as “trust” from the outside (see Lorenz, 1988; Baudry,
1994, Baudry, 1995), at regular time intervals, the large firm reserves the right
to redefine the relationship, up to the point of a total breakdown in the
relationship —i.e. termination of the contract— if the SME does not meet the
anticipated contractual obligations. Since there is no risk of the SME holding
up the large firm,
v
 the large firm ultimately controls the relationship.
These power assymetries are the basis for the relations between large firms
and SMEs in contemporary France. They allow the LMF to force the SME to
accept levels of intrusion that they would be hard-pushed to accept in many
other situations. For example, even though all suppliers accept quality checks,
in France such operations frequently amount to nothing less than full-fledged
industrial and financial quasi-audits of the SME (more details later). These and
similar informational links  give the LMF deep knowledge of the industrial and
financial situation of the SME.
2.3. Managing the French institutional solution: the elite network
The second institutional characteristic of French capitalism that is of interest
for this analysis, is that both directly and indirectly, French firms are integrated
in a broad network, organised by the state, which integrates administrative,
financial and industrial elites.
The existence of this elite network has been documented for a long time, at
least since Shonfield’s characterisation of the French political economy as a
conspiracy of big business and the state (Shonfield, 1965: 128; Birnbaum,
1994; Suleiman, 1979; Bourdieu, 1989; Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1987; Bauer
and Bertin-Mourot, 1995). It has its basis in the educational system. After a
highly competitive concours, the best young students are admitted to the
grandes écoles, where they are prepared for a career in public administration.7
After another round of tortuous exams, the top of these classes then moves
into the grands corps, where they spend a few years at the highest level of the
state apparatus. Through the typically French system of pantouflage, these
people are parachuted at or near the helm of France’s large companies or
banks. The career track then typically takes one of two forms. The first is the
circulation between the leadership of banks, industry and the state; the other is
the gradual (but nonetheless fast) climb from the sub-top to the top of a
company.
Several independent assessments (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1995, Birnbaum,
1994) conclude that the circulation of elites from the state to finance or
industry (and increasingly also back into the state -see Rouban 1994) has
increased over the last 10 years compared to the previous period. In numbers:
32% of the CEOs of large companies were transferred from the grands corps
in 1985, 38% in 1993. In 1985, 55% of the CEOs of large companies were
students of three schools—Polytechnique, ENA and HEC. In 1993 this number
had increased to 60%, an increase almost solely accounted for by the
“enarques,” the graduates of the ENA (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1995).
Instead of losing importance as a result of economic and industrial
modernisation, the elite network actually gained in importance throughout the
1980s (Suleiman, 1995).
This network provides a solution to the problems associated with information
assymetries, since for the bank —or more generally the financial sphere— the
large firm bridges the incommensurability problems resulting from SMEs and
banks belonging to fundamentally different worlds. The reason  that the large
firm can, is that it belongs to both.
With the SME, the large firm has direct industrial links and can bring its own
expertise to bear on those links: it can evaluate the industrial project of the
SME in ways that the banks generally cannot. The large firm not only has
deep general knowledge of production technology and product markets in the
industry where the SME operates, through informational channels  specific to
the large firm-SME relationship in France, it also has detailed specific
knowledge about the actual state of the SME. In short, the fundamental
informational assymetries endemic to the bank-SME relationship simply do not
exist in the large firm-SME relationship.
Within the large firm, the purchasing function, comprising both the purchasing
department and the supplier selection and support services translate the rough
technical-industrial data into more synthetic data, which can be used by the
financial departments. Quality control, quality audits and management
information systems are all designed with one idea in mind: to provide
management with summary information about parts and products usually
expressed in ways that are both useful and readable to those outside the
immediate production sphere as well, most importantly to those who8
negotiate contracts with suppliers (frequently lawyers and top management
services). This is the point where information which was originally destined for
workers and engineers only, has become extremely synthetic, standardised
and data which can easily be mobilised and used by many different people
with different goals —even the banks.
The flow of this information between the large firm and the bank, in turn, is
organised through the broader political-economic elite network which
organises the French economy and administration at the highest level. Since
these people are socialised in the same educational channels, belong to the
same grands corps, and have roughly the same experience after their school
years, they share a common understanding of (a) how to detect and define
issues, and (b) how to evaluate and respond to them. They are, in other
words, because of their educational and professional experience, socialised
into seeing, understanding and responding to problems in very similar ways.
Put simply, they speak the same language (Bourdieu, 1989; Kadushin, 1995).
Moreover, since members of this network frequently move in and out of top-
level positions in the industrial, financial and administrative world, the elite
network manages their career on the basis of their reputation in the network.
According to a recent study on the social composition of large firm CEOs in
France, over 80% of current top management had a career in public service
and/or formerly or currently state-owned banks and financial institutions (Bauer
and Bertin-Mourot, 1987; Schmidt, 1996). Reputation monitoring within this
network thus gives banks an additional mechanism to reduce financial risk.
Two things, as this short discussion suggests, therefore make up the specifics
of the French case: the relationship between the PME and the LMF, which
structures the information flows between them, and the network which exists
between the large firms and the banks. These two elements explain how
SMEs obtain access to finance. However, they also delineate what is
particularly French in this set-up.
2.4. France in comparative perspective
Some of the elements discussed in this paper are vaguely reminiscent of
Japan, where the relationship between the LMF and their suppliers are
structured within the keiretsu groupings. In exchange for loyalty to the LMF,
the supplier then has the guarantee of order by the large firm, and the large
firm supports the SME in ways that are very similar to what happens in France,
among others with financiers (i.e. the main bank and its affiliates) (Aoki, 1990;
Asanuma, 1989). Yet two elements, critical for the operation of the French
system, appear not to exist in the Japanese context.9
The most important is the assymetrical distribution of exit options: the
possibility of the large firm in France to leave the relationship. If a LMF does
something similar in Japan, the suppliers’ association would bring its power to
bear on the LMF, its strategic partners, company union and even the banks,
who would immediately use their power to redress the relationship. In short,
the relationship is far more symmetrical in Japan than it can ever be in France.
Additionally, despite appearances to the contrary, the elite network does not
play the same role in Japan. There is some kind of pantouflage (van Rixtel,
1995), but it is differently organised. It involves high-level civil servants who are
parachuted into top-management of holdings and banks, and whose sole job it
is to smoothen the relationships between the firm and the relevant ministries.
Yet they do not necessarily belong to the same elite, and there is, because of
the retirement situation, no way back into the state apparatus.
What follows elaborates the institutional argument on France in detail. Section
2 deals with the large firm as an interface in the credit relationship of the SME.
We first address the signalling effects in the triangle large firm-SME-bank.
Then we discuss the way substantive information that the large firm has on the
SME, is used by the bank. Section 3 deals with the situation where the bank
does not grant credit, but the LMF itself finances the SME.
3. The large manufacturing firm as an interface in finance
The relation between banks and firms is usually analysed as a bilateral
relationship. The firm provides information to the bank, which the bank
analyses and, as the case may be, decides to grant or to refuse credit. By and
large, two parties are involved in the relationship: the financial agent and the
industrial enterprise.
Yet the relationships between firms, in this case between SMEs and their
industrial and commercial environment, contains relevant information for
banks in many different ways. Firstly, the existence of a commercial contract
with a signature from a LMF buyer assures the bank that the SME is a
sufficiently serious industrial partner for the large firm and therefore a lower
risk to run for the bank. Secondly, quality certification according to ISO 9000
norms (in its local or firm variants) have the same effect: being awarded the
ISO certificate (or AFAQ certificate, as it is called in France), is the equivalent,
in the world of SME finance, of a stamp of “proper risk.” Thirdly, tailorised
quality audits of LMF who are customers of the SME, signal to the bank that
the supplier has been checked, controlled and approved by the LMF, thus
indirectly increasing its rating for the bank.10
These three types of relationships have the same mechanism at their basis:
they reduce the bank’s risk by virtue of the information of the industrial
relationship between large and small firms. The information is, in other words,
public information.
3.1. The integration of the SME in a commercial network
Increasingly, as many observers noted over the past decade, the relationships
between large and small firms have changed in character, from relatively
atomised, purely contractual relationships to strongly integrated “organic”
production networks, organised around relational contracts, or wider
technological or commercial networks around large firms (Sabel, 1989;
Harrison, 1994).
Being part of such a network with established large firms at their core, has two
types of effects on the access of SMEs to capital. First, ex ante the existence
of a commercial or sub-contracting arrangement or of an industrial partnership
between a LMF and a non-established firm, provides a signal for the banks
about the quality of the SME and therefore of the risk associated with lending.
Secondly,  ex post the existence of a contract provides a final repayment
guarantee for the bank.
3.1.1. the network as a signalling structure
When an established large firm chooses an industrial or commercial partner
among non-established firms, it indicates to the bank the quality of the SME.
Since the small firm is usually a supplier to, rather than a client of the large
firm (Duchéneault, 1995: 195), the commercial contract between the small and
the large firm formalises the existence of the SME’s market and demonstrates
the relevance of its core activities to outsiders. The supplier relationship
reduces the uncertainties of the SME in its market: it stabilises demand for its
products. Since supplier contracts are, as a rule, concluded for the life cycle of
a product, the client firm can not easily change suppliers. And since the
supplier relationship was conceived because the large firm either lacked inside
knowledge of technology or products, it is equally hard to make the product
itself. The large firm thus guarantees the small firm the production volume
needed to write off investments.
Negotiations on price-setting and the conventions on price revisions also allow
the SME to be(come) innovative and flexible. As a rule, LMF do not
reappropriate the full profits resulting from productivity improvements and
economies of scale. The reason is that such practices would not really be in11
their interest, since they reduce the capacities of the SMEs to be innovative,
they may jeopardise the quality of the products, and they may even make the
SME less flexible to respond to market fluctuations. The more equitable
redistribution of profits thus also protects the LMF, who does not run the costs
associated with bankruptcy of a supplier —finding another one, production
stops, and loss of customers.
Once this position of the SME in its industrial and commercial world is taken
into account, the non-established firm suddenly appears less fragile to the
financial world, since its markets are less uncertain and more diversified. In
1990, more French SMEs were suppliers than in 1980, but in each one of
them, sub-contracting accounted for a smaller proportion of turnover than ten
years before: 52% of the SMEs makes less than one-third of their turnover as
sub-contractors in 1990, against 38% in 1980.
3.1.2. the commercial network of the SME as guarantee
The second way the insertion of the SME in wider networks matters to the
financial world is as simple guarantee for credit repayment, i.e. as collateral.
This is related to the practice of commercial discounts, protected by the
Commercial Code in France. The discount, which is found among medium-
sized enterprises in particular, is a credit which is extended by the bank on the
basis of the debts that the clients of the small firms has a result of a
commercial contract. The banker thus makes credit available for the holder of
a contract against the transfer of (part of) the rights to the fruits of the contract.
Such a discount presents only a minor risk to the bank because of the
provisions of solidarity of contracting parties against creditors in commercial
law: the law treats all creditors on an even footing.
The mechanism at the basis of this information-credit loop, is that the bank,
instead of analysing the creditworthiness of the SME directly, analyses the
creditworthiness of the debtor, i.e. the LMF. The only action the bank
undertakes with regard to the SME, is ascertaining that it does not provide
false information, such as false letters of intent, false bills, or bills which have
already been submitted to another credit institution.
This practice of mobilising outstanding debts through the use of letters of
commitment (lettre de change) from the large firm thus gives the SME the
opportunity to use its commercial relationships in order to obtain credit.
Essentially, the bank moves the risk from a non-standard company (the SME)
to a firm which is recognised as a very reasonable risk by the banking
community (the LMF).12
3.2. Quality certification: the construction of public information
Since a few years, and as part of a wider modernising drive, LMF in France
have begun to emphasise “quality,” i.e. making things right the first time.
Whereas up until then, competitiveness was primarily the product of a
combination between progress in product technology and low relative costs, in
the mid-1980s large exporting firms actively initiated programs to increase
quality. The idea behind this was that many problems of production costs
were, in fact, accumulated quality problems (Lucas and Jocou, 1992).
Since between 50% and 85% of the value of a good is produced by outside
suppliers, quality of final products is to a large extent the outcome of quality in
supplied parts. The LMF’s increased quality preoccupations therefore quickly
led to attempts to impose stricter quality requirements upon suppliers. LMF
thus installed a variety of mechanisms to monitor quality, first after receipt of
parts and later, when this proved difficult because of JIT delivery systems
(where parts are delivered when needed in production and therefore cannot be
checked between delivery and utilisation), primarily through pro-active
monitoring systems. These quality monitoring systems between large firms
and SMEs are at the basis of the information flows between large, small and
medium-sized enterprises and banks.
Without doubt the most wide-spread of such monitoring systems are the
quality certification systems. In line with developments in other countries and
in part as a way of benefiting of the favourable relative cost-competitiveness of
French industry, LMF are demanding from their suppliers that they be certified
according to ISO 9000 norms. These quality norms assess how a product is
made, and the resources devoted to and the organisation in place for
monitoring (a) that pre-set quality standards are attained and permanently
monitored; and (b) that corrective action is taken when errors are found. The
ISO 9000 procedure, which exists in different national, sectoral or company
variants, essentially serves to demonstrate that a company can reflexively
correct its operations. ISO 9000 norms are, unlike DIN norms or most other
categories of ISO norms, procedural norms: they evaluate the process used to
make a product, in theory without consideration of the product itself.
In the relationship between the LMF and the supplier, ISO 9000 norms also
serve another, related but still somewhat different function. It comes close to
assuring the LMF that the SME can adjust its production in a similar way. Being
good at making a particular part now, can be the result of deep, perhaps
extremely specific knowledge about that part, or of being able to flexibly adjust
production and quality to different demands. In the first of these two possibilities,
parts suppliers cannot guarantee that they can adjust to volatile market
conditions and/or rapid technological or material innovations, since their
capabilities are tied to stable markets, in technologically mature industries. In13
the second case, the LMF knows that the SME masters the instruments to
adjust itself to new market conditions or technological shocks. ISO 9000-type
procedural norms provide (the closest thing to) guarantees to the large firm
that the SME can survive extreme demands on its capacities. This explains
why many large firms, in France and elsewhere, have pressured their
suppliers to be ISO 9000-certified (Baudry, 1994).
The practical organisation of quality certification is left to a private, quasi-
cooperative agency, The Association Française pour l’Assurance de la Qualité
or AFAQ.  sponsored by the industry federations and the large firms, and
whose goal it is to test, audit and improve the quality system in the companies.
The AFAQ sends a team consisting of a certified quality auditors and a
sectoral expert. For both of these, professional knowledge is the basis for their
appraisal: quality norms are very different in a poultry farm than in ceramics or
car parts, and hence the double angle of quality and sectoral knowledge. For
their certification, the firms pay the AFAQ a fee. Through a transfer of authority
from the state agency responsible for norming, the Association Française de
Normalisation, the AFNOR, to the AFAQ, (they signed an agreement in March
1993, mutually recognising each other’s certificates) the quality certificates
bear an official imprimatur.
The primary and secondary functions of quality certification for the LMF —the
assurance of quality and the relative certainty of reflexive adjustment to
changing market conditions— thus are signalling elements in the triangle
between the SME, the LMF and the bank. They demonstrate to the bank that
the SME is positioned favorably in a volatile world, and that its so-called
“industrial project” can be regarded as viable. Put more bluntly: an AFAQ-
certified company is, in every possible regard, a safer risk for a financier than a
company that is not certified.
3.3. Quality audits by the large firm: vehicles for information
A second important instrument, which serves a similar purpose in this triangle,
is the quality audit. Whereas many large firms rely solely on quality certification
à la ISO 9000 in their selection of subcontracting partners, a sizeable group
retains its own in-house system of private and customised quality audits.
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These are exercises whereby the LMF sends out a team of their own experts
to examine the supplier’s operations in great detail. The team examines all the
processes that play a role in the production of the part or the service that the
supplier delivers, and that bear on quality, delivery, price or other relevant
aspects. By focusing on aspects of the production process instead of the spot-
checking associated with product quality, the larger firm assures a proper
understanding of the supplier’s capability to follow the technological path that
the large firm takes or may take with its products.14
However, and much more importantly, the quality audit is not limited to what is
immediately relevant for the part or service under the supplier’s responsibility.
During the audit, the team also examines most other components of the firm’s
operations: training and recruitment, balance sheet, finance, links with other
SMEs and larger firms, product development capabilities and market
strategies, technology, etc. In short, the so-called quality audit, as should be
apparent from this short list, is in reality a true audit of the entire company.
This information, read through the eyes of the experienced auditors typically
found in these auditing teams (all have many years of factory as well as
headquarters and financial experience, which also expains why there are only
few of them), will allow them to assess the potential of the supplier for long-
term process and product innovation with relative confidence. Some go even
further: Renault, for example, sends out a team of supplier consultants to help
the supplier improve its performance.
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These three mechanisms —discounting contracts against bills, quality
certification and customised quality audits— which all rely on public
information, are  found combined in practice, and therefore reinforce each
other’s impact. All three work according to the same mechanism: the existence
of a relationship between LMF and SME itself, without further, often more
intimate knowledge of the substance of this link, is a signal to the bank that it
should treat the financing requests of the SME seriously.
Two assumptions were critically important in this treatment of the use that the
SME can make of its commercial, technological and productive network
relations in order to obtain finance. The first was the absence of opportunism
(i.e. deliberately false signals) from the part of the SME, the other was that the
bank trusted the information provided by the SME as valid. Both assumptions
are reasonable if the existence of interfirm commercial or productive ties is
public knowledge, accessible to all actors, and if there are supplementary
mechanisms —such as common socialisation, trust generated through iterated
interactions, and reputation monitoring— which reinforce the bank’s conviction
that the LMF expert will not willfully distort information.
4. Delegation of finance to the large firm
If, instead of relying on the LMF as an expert, the bank chooses to ration credit,
a different, complementary form of finance could develop in response, which is
called “double intermediation” in the literature (Dei Ottati, 1994): the established
large firm, which itself obtained credit in a regular manner in the financial world
(first intermediation), directly or indirectly becomes a financial intermediary15
itself. Direct intermediation means that the large firm grants payment delays to
a client, grants long or medium term loans or that the LMF takes a
participation in the SME. Indirect mediation refers to the provision of services,
licenses, technology transfer etc. Secondly, the LMF supports local SMEs
financially and technically as part of a broader strategy of local economic
development (sometimes compensating the local impact of a lage
restructuring). Credit provision in industrial districts follows a third large pattern:
here, the LMF acts as a bridge to the financial world for all the SMEs in the
district.
4.1. Long and medium term inter-firm credit
The first type of credit is the one where the LMF directly or indirectly
subsidises activities by the SME. The LMF provides the SME with services
and/or technology that are relatively hard to obtain for the SME because of its
proprietary nature, relatively expensive or simply inexistent but impossible for
the SME to create —however, they may be necessary for the SMEs
competitive survival. LMF, for example, frequently organise and fund training
programmes for the SME’s workers or engineers, helps install quality
monitoring tools, makes machinery available to the supplier, subsidises the
acquisition of new technology or licenses, helps the SME explore new
products or markets, and generally put their expertise at the supplier’s
disposal. What are, given the total turnover of the company, relatively small
investments for the LMF, may be of existential importance to the SME.
Why and how do LMF proceed to such a transfer of means and resources,
and engage in this type of support “in kind”? “Why” is a relatively easy
question to answer. The process of industrial reorganisation in the 1980s has
forced LMF and SMEs to forge such close ties. Even though SMEs are by far
the more dependent party in the relationship, neither of the two is fully
autarkic, and both of them therefore have to invest in the relationship: the
supplier by providing high quality goods at low costs, the LMF  by defining the
relationship as long-term.
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By doing this, the LMF also safeguards its own future: by reducing the risk of
bankruptcy of the supplier, the LMF assures continuity in its own operations.
These types of interlinking credits (Dei Ottati, 1994) thus allow the LMF to
stabilise the market of the SME and thus to safeguard the industrial
partnership.
“How,” then, is related to the information flows discussed before: the quality
audits and quality consulting services. Through these recurrent in-depth
investigations, the LMF has a detailed view of the supplier’s product market,16
technology, training and financial situation, which is used to assess the future
of the partnership link. The LMF knows, as discussed before, both the strong
and weak points of the supplier, and can adjust its support accordingly.
4.2. Local development funds
The second type of credit is part of the policy of large firms to simultaneously
make their local environment more dynamic and to stabilise it. For many
reasons, the LMF considers itself responsible for the vitality of its local
economy. First of all, the LMF needs a dynamic network of SMEs as suppliers
and subcontractors, especially in situations of just-in-time delivery. Secondly,
the existence of such an active industrial environment will allow the large firm
to keep its own social peace, by being able to transfer employees to new or
existing supplier firms and thus further the employment of workers in the
group.
Specialised financial institutes, frequently tied to the large firm through
ownership or partnership links, grant medium and long-term credits to the local
SMEs. Such “reconversion societies” (sociétés de reconversion), which are
created by the LMF in France have exactly this goal: they organise credit flows
among their local suppliers and other local SMEs. On occasions, these loans
are transformed into subsidies if the SME hires workers from the large firm
associated with the loan, and the LMF will even help the SME administratively
or consult it on strategy and business plan.
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4.3. Finance flows in the industrial district
In the industrial district, finally, the financial links between LMF and suppliers
take a related but different form. The reason why this form of economic
organisation commanded such attention in the 1980s and 1990s, was that
they were able to compete succesfully with large firms, despite their presumed
diseconomies of scale and their reliance on traditional craft methods (Marshall,
1919; Becattini, 1990; Sabel, 1989).
After a few years of research into the operation of industrial districts, especially
those in Germany, but afterwards in other countries as well, a major corrective
to the initial images was introduced. In many cases, it turned out, the districts
were tied into the world economy as much through the intermediary of large
firms as through their own activities, and in most cases, it was simply
impossible to think of the regional economies that thus emerged without also
thinking of the large firm that organised them. (Streeck, 1992; Harrison, 1994;
Mueller and Loveridge, 1995). In short, the conclusion of these two waves of17
research was that large firms remained critical actors, even in the industrial
districts.
This observation is crucial for a proper understanding of why the industrial
district is the fourth form of SME finance through the large firm (Dei Ottati,
1994). In an industrial district, the argument goes, the divison of labour
between firms is such that it reinforces what Durkheim called “an organic
social solidarity:” the activities of one firm are indispensable to the survival of
all and vice versa, analogous to the mutual dependence of families in
subsistence economies. Because of this, co-operation is necessary, and this
reinforces pre-existing trust relationships. Trust is therefore a resource whose
value grows with use (Dei Ottati, 1994). Relying on trust in economic
transactions clears the way for more diffuse relationships, which makes
possible economic transactions —at relatively low cost— which would
otherwise be very hard to carry out.
In such a system, trust becomes the medium that clears the way for
information, which, in turn, becomes the basis for the extension of credit in the
district. As Dei Ottati (Dei Ottati, 1994:540-41) points out, only the established
firm extends credit. This firm has inside knowledge about production
technology and capabilities of the SMEs in the district, and has the links with
world markets, and is therefore able to assess investment projects of the
(usually sub-contracting) SMEs. It directly finances investment projects,
including start-ups of the SMEs —often by discounting the loan in part from
the orders of the large firm with the sub-contractors.
The large firms also act as gate-keepers for bank finance. The double inside
knowledge is equally useful for banks: they can, as described above, rely on
the expert knowledge of the large firm to asses investment projects for them,
and trust them because of a combination of local experience of co-operation
(which reinforces trust) and a socialisation of the communicating officers in the
bank and the large firm through the same educational, administrative and
general career networks. Bank finance in the industrial district is, in other
words, a special case of the general principle of delegated selection of
investment described above (section 2).
No detailed descriptions of the operations of industrial districts are available
which allow us to conclude that these credit mechanisms also play the crucial
role in France which they play in the Italian industrial districts. The most obvious
explanation for this are the crucial differences in their nature. Whereas Italian
industrial districts are, certainly since the initial statements by Brusco (Brusco,
1986) and Piore & Sabel (Piore and Sabel, 1984), associated with industrial
dynamism, the parallel cases in France are rather the opposite. The few cases
that persisted throughout the postwar period, were the result of residual18
“backwardness,” rather than forward-looking dynamism (Ganne, 1992). And in
these cases, financing innovation was not a central issue.
On the other hand, “new” districts, which emerged in the high-tech regions —
Rhône-Alpes, or the Bassin of Paris— were much closer to a form of industrial
organisation that the banks recognised, and were, anyway, centered around
large firms. The area around Grenoble, in the French south-east, for example
specialises in machine-tools, is highly concentrated, invests heavily in
research and development, and has several large firms who stabilise the
region: Thomson-CSF, Merlin-Gerin, Hewlett-Packard,... (Courlet and
Pecqueur, 1992: 101). For the banks, this setting represents a totally different
type of risk evaluation than a “pure” small-firm industrial district would.
However, in the regional economies in the west of the country, even though
they borrow only a little from the industrial district model, some of these large-
firm centered models are operative. In the Rennes-Laval area, for example,
the Citroèn plants, which located there in search of a relatively docile, cheap
labor force in the 1960s, act as a single interface between its suppliers and the
rest of the world, and therefore also the financial world.
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 The relationship is not
unlike that of the old “notable” in the village, who also was its only link with the
central state before modernisation set in after the Second World War (Ganne,
1992).
Industrial districts —or better: regional economies— in France are, even more
perhaps than in Italy, therefore dependent upon and a product of the large
firms. Local development banks do not exist, so credit cannot flow into the
district in this way; surviving “old” industrial districts are signs of backwardness
instead of local dynamism, so financing innovation is not a necessity there;
and the existing regional economies are firmly anchored in and, hence, also
dominated by large firms. It is fair to say that, without the large firms, regional
economies simply would not exist in France.
5. Conclusion
Small and medium-sized companies face particular problems when trying to
obtain external finance in the classical ways. Their general situation is too far
removed from the world that financing sources know well in order for them to
neatly fall into the evaluation categories that the banks use. As a result, since
the bank cannot use its resources to evaluate the investment plans of the
SME, financing by the traditional sources is low for SMEs.19
The solution for this cul-de-sac is provided by the large firms. They are part of
the industrial world of the SME, and thus have the knowledge and expertise to
be able to evaluate the request for funds, but also of the bank, and can
therefore relay that information to the bank. The mechanism through which
this transfer of information is assured, is the dense elite network at the helm of
the French economy, which comprises both large firm CEOs and bankers. The
members of this network not only are educated in the same schools and
received a similar professional socialisation, which allows them to understand
each other, they also monitor each other’s career in the network closely. Both
mechanisms breed trust, upon which the financial relationship is based, which
closes the circle. In many ways, as we documented in the paper, the large firm
indirectly guarantees the bank that its investment is safe and sound, and when
the bank cannot be convinced, the large firm might directly take over some of
the financing.
The large firm is therefore the institutional solution to permanently
underfinanced SMEs in France. Other countries (may) have other solutions,
but we suspect that the large firms play a relatively important role in many
other countries as well. The reason is that everywhere in Europe (and the US)
large firms have reorganised their activities in order to concentrate on what
they consider their core tasks. This, as we discussed for France, changed the
basic parameters of the relationship between large and small firms. To some
extent, as we suggested at several places in the text, the large firm’s action as
a go-between for bank and SMEs is also in its own interest. Helping the SME
obtain finance also secures the relationship. Precisely these characteristics
are also found elsewhere: on the new industrial map, all large firms benefit if
their suppliers are dynamic and stable and help in finance is a reasonable quid
pro quo.
In other words, if industrial restructuring is truly as profound as many
observers now agree, the mechanisms that we analysed in this paper for
France, may well be or become very important in other countries as well, even
though they will graft themselves in different ways upon the prevailing institu-
tional framework which organises the relationships between firms. Some
existing financing arrangements, for example, are more favorable to SMEs
than others, and legal frameworks make the construction of trust-based
relational investment strategies, encompassing large and small firms, more
likely in some countries than in others. But the tools are there, and economic
actors can decide whether or not to use them.
xi
In conclusion, this takes us to a very old, recently revitalised debate in the
social sciences. According to a very important current in political economy,
dating back as far as Smith and Marx, national economic systems
asymptotically converge on a similar, most efficient system as a result of
selection through the market (Kerr, et al., 1964). The argument in this paper20
suggests something else: even if the problems that companies and (by
extension) nations face, increasingly are “objectively” the same, since their
definitions and the repertoire of possible solutions are institutionally generated,
there will be just as many differences as before in response to these similar
market pressures. Convergence remains therefore, even in this most
conducive of worlds, a very unlikely outcome.21
References
Acs, Z. J. and D. B. Audretsch, 1990. Small firms and Entrepreneurship: a comparison between
west and east countries, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Discussion
Paper FS IV 90-13
Aoki, M., 1990. Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 28, no. 1
Asanuma, B., 1989. Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships in Japan and the Concept of Relation-
Specific Skill, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, vol. 3, no. 1
Baudry, B., 1994. De la confiance dans la relation d’emploi ou de sous-traitance, Sociologie du
Travail, vol. 36, no. 1
Bauer, M., 1988. The Politics of State-Directed Privatisation: The Case of France. 1986-88,
West European Politics, vol. 11, no. 4
Bauer, M. and B. Bertin-Mourot, 1987. Les 200, Paris, Le Seuil
Bauer, M. and B. Bertin-Mourot, 1995. L’Acces au Sommet, des Grandes Entreprises
Francaises. 1985-1994, Paris, C.N.R.S. Observatoire des Dirigeants and Boyden
Becattini, G., 1990. The Marshallian industrial district as a socio-economic notion, (in) Industrial
districts and economic regeneration. F. Pyke and W. Sengenberger (ed.), Geneva: ILO
Benko, G. and A. Lipietz (ed.), 1992. Les régions qui gagnent. Districts et réseaux. Les
nouveaux paradigmes de la géographie économique,  Paris, Presses Universitaires de
France
Berger, S. and M. J. Piore, 1980. Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies, Cambridge
MA, Cambridge University Press
Binks, M., C. Ennew and G. Reed, 1992. Information asymmetries and the provision of finance
to small firms, International Small Business Journal, vol. 11, no. 1
Birnbaum, P., 1994. Les sommets de l’état. Essai sur l’élite du pouvoir en France, Paris, Le Seuil
Bourdieu, P., 1989. La Noblesse d’État. Grandes écoles et esprit de corps, Paris, Éditions de
Minuit
Boyer, R. and J.-P. Durand, 1993. L’après-fordisme, Paris, Syros
Brusco, S., 1986. Small firms and industrial districts. The experience of Italy, (in) New firms and
regional development in Europe, D. Keeble and E. Wever (ed.), London, Croom Helm
Casper, S., 1995. How Public Law Influences Decentralized Supplier Network Organization in
Germany: The cases of BMW and Audi, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung,
Discussion Paper FS I 95-314
Courlet, C. and B. Pecqueur, 1992. Les systèmes industriels localisés en France. Un nouveau
modèle de développement, (in) Les régions qui gagnent. Districts et réseaux: les nouveaux
paradigmes de la géographie économique, G. Benko and A. Lipietz (ed.), Paris, Preses
Universitaires Françaises22
de Saint Louvent, P., 1991.  Analyse de la perception de la banque par les petites et moyennes
entreprises en Grande Bretagne, Allemagne et France, Bossard Consultant,
Deeg, R., 1992. Banks and the State in Germany. The critical role of subnational institutions in
economic governance, Political Science, MIT
Dei Ottati, G., 1994. Trust, interlinking transactions and credit in the industrial district, Cambridge
Journal of Economics, vol. 18, no. 6
Duchéneault, B., 1995. Enquête sur les PME françaises. Identités, Contextes, Chiffres, Paris,
Maxima
Ganne, B., 1992. Place et évolution des systèmes industriels locaux en France. Economie
politique d’une transformation, (in) Les régions qui gagnent. Districts et réseaux: les
nouveaux paradigmes de la géographie économique, G. Benko and A. Lipietz (ed.), Paris,
Presses Universitaires France
Granovetter, M., 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
American Journal of Sociology, vol. 91, no. 3
Harrison, B., 1994. Lean and Mean. The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of
Flexibility, New York, Basic Books
Holcblat, N. and M. Husson, 1990. L’industrie française, Paris, La Découverte
Kadushin, C., 1995. Friendship Among the French Financial Elite, American Sociological
Review, vol. 60, no. 2
Kerr, C., J. Dunlop, F. Harbison and C. Myers, 1964. Industrialism and Industrial Man, New York,
Oxford University Press
Knight, F. H., 1921. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Hougton Mifflin,
Levy, J., 1994. Toqueville’s Revenge. Dilemmas of institutional reform in post-dirigiste France,
Department of Political Science, MIT
Locke, R. M., 1995. Remaking the Italian Economy, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press
Locke, R. M. and K. Thelen, 1995. Apples and Oranges Revisited: Contextualized Comparison
and the Study of Comparative Labor Politics, Politics and Society, vol. 23, no. 3
Lorenz, E. H., 1988. Neither Friends nor Strangers. Informal Networks of Subcontracting in
French Industry, (in) Trust. Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, D. Gambetta (ed.),
Oxford, Basil Blackwell
Loveman, G. and W. Sengenberger, 1991. The Re-emergence of Small-Scale Production: An
International Comparison, Small Business Economics, vol. no. 3
Lucas, F. and P. Jocou, 1992. Au coeur du changement. Une autre démarche de management:
la qualité totale, Paris, Dunod
MacLean, M., 1995. Privatisation in France 1993-94: New Departures or a case of plus ça
change?, West European Politics, vol. 18, no. 2
Marshall, A., 1919. Industry and Trade, London, MacMillan
Midler, C., 1993. L’auto qui n’existait pas, Paris, Intereditions
Mueller, F. and R. Loveridge, 1995. The ‘Second Industrial Divide’? The Role of the Large Firm
in the Baden-Württemberg Model, Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 4, no. 323
Penrose, E., 1963. Facteurs, conditions et mécanismes de la croissance de l’entreprise, Neuilly-
sur-Seine, Editions Hommes & Techniques
Piore, M. J., 1993. The revival of prosperity in industrial economies. Technological trajectories,
organizational structure, competitivity, (in) Technology and the Wealth of Nations. The
Dynamics of Constructed Advantage, D. Foray and C. Freeman (ed.), London, New York,
Pinter Publishers
Piore, M. J. and C. F. Sabel, 1984. The Second Industrial Divide. Possibilities for Prosperity,
New York, Basic Books
Psillaki, M. and G. Mondello, 1995. Financement des PME : coûts de transaction et coordination,
Table ronde : finance et Industrie, Lyon, 24-25 March
Quack, S. and S. Hildebrandt, 1995. Hausbank or Fournisseur? Bank Services for Small and
Medium Sized Enterprises in Germany and France, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für
Sozialforschung, Discussion Paper FS I 95-102
Rivaud-Danset, D., 1995. Le rationnement du crédit et l’incertitude, Revue d’économie politique,
vol. 105, no. 2
Rochard, M. B., 1987. La sous-traîtance: entreprises et emplois. Le secteur de l’électronique
professionelle, CEE-CEREQ-SESSI,
Sabel, C. F., 1989. Flexible specialisation and the re-emergence of regional economies, (in)
Reversing industrial decline? Industrial structure and industrial policy in Britain and her
competitors, P. Hirst and J. Zeitlin (ed.), Oxford, Berg
Sabel, C. F., 1993. Learning by Monitoring, (in) The Handbook of Economic Sociology, N.
Smelser and R. Swedberg (ed.), Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press
Sabel, C. F., 1995. Bootstrapping Reform: Rebuilding Firms, the Welfare State, and Unions,
Politics and Society, vol. 23, no. 1
Salais, R. and M. Storper, 1992. The four ‘worlds’ of contemporary industry, Cambridge Journal
of Economics, vol. 16 no. 2
Salais, R. and M. Storper, 1993. Les mondes de production. Enquête sur l’identité économique
de la France, Paris, Éditions de l’École des Hautes Études en Science Sociales
Schmidt, V. A., 1996. From State to Market? The transformation of business in France,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Shonfield, A., 1965. Modern Capitalism. The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power,
Oxford, Oxford University Press
Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss, 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, The
American Economic Review, vol. 71, no. 3
Storper, M. and R. Salais, 1992. The division of labour and industrial diversity: flexibility and
mass production in the French automobile industry, International Review of Applied
Economics, vol. 6, no. 1
Streeck, W., 1992. Social Institutions and Economic Performance, London, Sage
Suleiman, E., 1979. Les Elites en France, Paris, Le Seuil
Suleiman, E., 1995. Les ressorts cachés de la réussite française, Paris, Le Seuil24
van Rixtel, A. A. R. J. M., 1995. Amakudari in the japanese banking industry: an empirical
investigation, CEPR/WZB Conference, Berlin, 1-2 December,
Vitols, S., 1995. German Banks and the Modernization of the Small Firm Sector: Long-Term
Finance in Comparative Perspective, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung,
Discussion Paper FS I 95-309
Ziegler, N. J., 1994. Retooling the Industrial Plant. Political Strategies for Technological Advance
in France and Germany, manuscript,
NOTES
                                                          
i
. Despite these limitations, suppliers are an important category of firms in the French
industrial landscape. The national statistical office, the INSEE, distinguishes between
manufacturers of intermediate goods (U04, a proxy for suppliers), equipment goods (U05,
a proxy for machine-tools) and consumer goods (U06). In 1990, the distribution of firms
with a size between 50 and 500 employees over these categories was: producers of
intermediate goods (U04) 3217 firms (33% of total), equipment goods (U05) 2708 firms
(28%), and consumer goods (U06) 3805 firms (39%). Also, compared to other European
countries, a larger proportion of SMEs in France are suppliers: in 1991, 43% of the small
firms realised over one-third of their turn-over as sub-contractors  —the corresponding
figures for the UK and Germany are below 20% (de Saint Louvent, 1991).
ii
. This appears increasingly true of large firms as well. Labor unions are too weak and lack
the competence to evaluate business plans; small shareholders have no access to the
books; and class action suits do not, as a rule, exist in France, even consumers have few
means at their disposal to counter employers’ actions. According to some observers, this
explains the rise in CEO-linked legal cases in recent years. Only few of them are actually
convicted —but in the absence of other practical means, legal action makes a detailed look
inside the company possible (see Le Monde 10 Feb 1996 for details).
iii
. Since very shortly, some attempts are going on to create a separate Bourse for SME stocks
in Paris. From all accounts, there are major difficulties with this new stock market model,
for precisely the reasons outlined above (see the Economist 25 Feb 1995; Libération 15 Feb
1996 for more on the SME stock markets).
iv
. Things appear to be changing now because the government is selling off the large state-
owned firms through public offerings, which by its very nature increases the role of the
stock market. However, as several assessments have concluded, instead of truly
“privatising” the firms, what appears to be happening, both in the 1986 de-
nationalisations and in those of the 1990s, is that a stable nucleus of shareholders
emerged, consisting of a few other major large firms, which acted as a protective shield
against hostile take-overs and overly demanding small shareholders. Not surprisingly,
the political-economic elite which governs France’s administrative apparatus and its large
firms (see below) plays a critical role in this reconfiguration of ownership in French
industry (see Bauer, 1988; MacLean, 1995).25
                                                                                                                                                                         
v
. Why this is so, is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is fair to say that it is
probably related to two elements in the organisation of French industry. The first is that
in some sectors, despite the extremely oligopolistic structure, companies are involved in
fierce, head-to-head competition. Thus, as a result of the 15% dependency rule of the
supplier, the SME becomes too independent and there is no guarantee for any of the large
firms that the competition will not benefit from the contract that one firm has with the
supplier. This is the case, for example, in cars (Renault and Peugeot) and consumer
electronics (Thomson, Moulinex). The second reason is that the French system remains
one in which the organisation of decision-making in product development is still, despite
other steps that have been made to make the system more efficient, extremely hierarchical
(Taddéi and Coriat, 1993; Boyer and Durand, 1993; and Midler, 1993). Conceptual work
and strategic decision-making power remains at head quarters, while suppliers execute.
A report describing the situation in the mid-1980s used the term inter-company Taylorism
to speak of the relationship between large firms and their suppliers (Rochard, 1987).
Things have changed since then, but the basic structure is still the same.
vi
. The composition of this group suggests the guiding hand of the French state, who uses its
economic clout to organise the SMEs into competitive firms. Almost all the companies
who have kept separate individual quality audits, even among AFAQ-certified suppliers,
are state-owned: e.g. Renault, EDF-GDF, Rhône-Poulenc, ELF, etc. The information was
provided by the AFAQ itself during interviews in October 1994. See Note
AFAQ/DG/J/251. màj 1994.10.19.
vii
. Interview at Renault purchasing department, 25 Oct 1994.
viii
. Note that the relationship is therefore not one in which the supplier can hold up the LF.
The SME has not enough strategic knowledge and the LF can reassign the contract —a
costly option, but not prohibitive.
ix
. See, for example, the aid package put together by the French national electricity company:
Développement économique local, EDF/DII, 1995.
x
. Information obtained during interviews with Citroèn management and labour unionists
in the area in April 1993. More details are found in Auto-Hebdo, the Citroèn house
magazine. These structures are not unlike what Locke (Locke, 1995) describes in Italian
regional economies, and Vitols (Vitols, 1995) for the relations between small savings
banks and SMEs in Germany.
xi
. See Steve Casper (Casper, 1995) for the metaphor of the toolkit in analysing the
relationships between companies in Germany. Put simply, the argument is that
institutional frameworks do not offer a single solution to existing problems, as
institutionalists tend to suggests (see Locke and Thelen, 1995), but a wide variety of
possible strategies, among which firms can choose. Once chosen, the process may be
relatively path-dependent and irreversible, but up until that moment, many choices are
open. It could be, of course, that, in addition to the first, a second, third, fourth, etc.
branching point appears, itself conditioned by the previous ones, but with a relatively
large number of options. Looked at over a longer period of time, it may then appear as if
the world could be reconstructed from the bottom up. The central question is how the
different strategies are related —are they part of the same, relatively limited family of
options, or is everything possible, as Sabel (Sabel, 1995) seems to suggest?